Downing Street Memos

-CTF Editorial: June 9, 2005

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY. Until now.

Until now, there have been rumors that the Bush Administration intentionally lied us into war. These rumors have generally been put aside with accusations of mere political partisanship, as if those lodging the charges didn't care about the notion that men might be dying for no reason. No, the Bush Administration and a good portion of the mainstream press merely characterized these people as playing political games.

But it seems now that the critics were quite correct, and the "political gaming" was being played by the Bush Administration. They were playing with our sons and daughter's lives, as well as with innocent Iraqi lives.

And the proof of this comes, not from a partisan source, not even an American source, but a series of secret memos now leaked to the public. Going as far back as mid-2002, the memos detail the minutes of meetings between the Blair government's representatives in America and the Bush Administration prior to the war. British representatives were reporting back to Mr. Blair that Bush decided to go to war even though Iraq was NOT an immediate threat, that they were falsifying intelligence to bolster the case for war with the public, and that the British were trying to find a way to cover their asses legally should it ever come out that they cooperated with this violation of international law, and would have to face charges in criminal court at the Hague.

Key portions of the Downing Street Memos read as follows:

Manning Memo

"C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

"It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force."

"The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation."

"The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change."

"We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers."

Cabinet Office Paper

The following is from a transcript rather than the original document, in order to protect the source of the whistleblower:

"The US Government's military planning for action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular, little thought has been given to creating the political conditions for military action, or the aftermath and how to shape it."

"... we face the real danger that the US will commit themselves to a course of action which we would find very difficult to support."

"Even if regime change is a necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is certainly not a sufficient one."

"US views of international law vary from that of the UK and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law."

"A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the US military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely the means by which the desired end state would be created, in particular what form of Government might replace Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within which it would be possible to identify a successor. We must also consider in greater detail the impact of military action on other UK interests in the region."

It is notable that the British also consulted Foreign Office lawyers, who were consistently doubtful of the legality of war, and one deputy legal director, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, ultimately resigned because she believed the conflict was a “crime of aggression”.

But it should be noted that the blame for the American public not getting this information it needed to make an informed decision with regards to Iraq lies not just with Administration efforts to falsify intelligence, and not with the fact that British government officials hid their doubts behind top secret clearances. It also lies with a myopic, meek, and irresponsible mainstream media which, from the date of the release of this highly damaging information until today, simply didn't ask the hard questions of the Administration that RESPONSIBLE journalism would have demanded.

In 19 separate White House Press Briefings, the mainstream press asked 900 questions of Press Secretary Scott McClellan. Only 2 were about the Downing Street Memos.

 

Links to the full memos in .pdf format:

Manning Corroboration
Meyer Corroboration
Rickets Corroboration
Options Paper Corroboration